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. Lost in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC's
Regulatory Response to Dark Pools
Allison Hintz*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Truth will ultimately prevail where there is pains to bring it to light."
- George Washington
Computers have hijacked the global markets from human control.
In the world of exchanges, dark pools are rising quickly, enveloping a
world once run by humans. Dark pools are trumpeted as cloaking
devices designed to hide from robotic algorithms programmed to ruth-
lessly hunt down and pick off trader intentions. As trading venues
designed mainly for large institutional investors, dark pools are touted
as exchange systems that minimize "information leakage"' and deter
"predatory conduct," such as front-running.2
Savvy traders unfairly exploit securities markets by employing op-
portunistic arbitrage strategies originating in high-frequency trading.
Firms are able to use sophisticated computer algorithms to trade se-
curities in milliseconds. 3 That technology, combined with a paid-for
special connection to a dark pool,4 allows high-frequency traders to
use subscribers' information to trade ahead.5 In other words, dark
pool subscribers have become victims of the exact misconduct dark
pools were designed to avoid.
For example, suppose an institutional investor seeks to buy 200,000
shares of IBM at a certain price range. That institutional investor pre-
fers to hide its order inside a dark pool, instead of placing the order on
a traditional exchange, such as the NASDAQ. A high-frequency
* Juris Doctor, Certificate in Business Law, DePaul University College of Law, anticipated
May 2015; Bachelor of Arts, Economics & Legal Studies of Business, University of St. Thomas,
June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Andrew Gold and Professor Cary Martin for their
valuable feedback and guidance. Thank you to the BCLJ editorial staff for your zealous support
throughout the writing process.
1. eBX, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,969, 2012 WL 4580151, *2 (Oct. 3, 2012).
2. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038, *2
(Oct. 24, 2011).
3. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys 9-10 (2014).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. LEWIS, supra note 3, at 9-10.
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trader that has paid for a special connection to the dark pool chosen
by the institutional investor is able to find that institutional investor's
order, buy some or all of the 200,000 shares of IBM on the NASDAQ,
and then quickly turn around and sell them to the institutional inves-
tor at a higher price. High-frequency traders are able to exploit or-
ders sent to dark pools. Rightfully so, dark pools of liquidity are
receiving an increased amount of attention from the media, financial
industry and regulators.
This Comment argues that while dark pools may be necessary ve-
nues for large institutional trading, regulations geared toward prevent-
ing information leakage and predatory practices are seriously lacking.
Unlike other publications, this Comment does not argue whether the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") or Financial Industry Reg-
ulatory Authority ("FINRA") should, as a general matter, heavily or
lightly regulate dark pools. 6 Instead, this Comment details the pro-
posed regulations as they stand and analyzes those regulations in
terms of their effectiveness in curbing predatory behavior. The analy-
sis set forth within applies not only to the current proposed regula-
tions, but may be used as guidelines for policymakers in future when
making decisions pertaining to regulating dark pools.
This Comment is divided into five parts. Part I provides a brief un-
derstanding of darks pools, details two problems plaguing dark pools
- information leakage and front-running - and provides an under-
standing of the proposed regulatory framework surrounding dark
pools. Part II subsection (A) addresses the history and purpose of
dark pools. It also provides explanatory definitions of key terms ref-
erenced throughout the Comment. Part II subsection (B) explains the
most recent events that have placed dark pools in the regulatory hot
seat. Part III of this Comment explains in detail the proposed regula-
tions set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Part IV examines the SEC's
proposed regulations' effectiveness at curbing information leakage
and predatory practices. I present my conclusion in Part V.
II. BACKGROUND
The Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 were drafted
with the expectation that they would establish a market system based
6. See Edwin Batista, A Shot in The Dark: An Analysis of the SEC's Response to the Rise of
Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 86-87 (2014).
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on strict disclosure to investors.7 Perhaps unanticipated were the cer-
tain opaque places in the market where "stocks change hands in the
dark."'8 Technological advances and rules allowing for expanded ac-
cess to exchanges have given rise to high-frequency trading ("HIFT"). 9
HFT is a trading strategy using super-fast computers to trade at high
speeds, potentially as fast as 13 milliseconds over 827 miles, 10 and
computer algorithms to trade orders and analyze data.' These com-
puter algorithms are so sophisticated that they can scan the market
and almost instantaneously locate pricing discrepancies to exploit.
tIFT, in all its speed and sophistication, allows for open-market
trades to be front-run. Front-running is the practice of trading on
leaked information before the event on which the information is
based has been realized, thus making the trade on which the informa-
tion was based more expensive or less lucrative. 12 Investors looking
to escape front-running sought out dark pools where their positions
would be more secure. Settled in these alleged havens, investors are
succumbing to the very practices they sought to escape.
A. The Rise of Dark Liquidity
Global equity markets have undergone significant changes over the
past decade. 13 In many jurisdictions, including the United States, mar-
ket participants must consult multiple sources of liquidity for equity
securities in order to obtain the best execution. 14 Exchange and non-
exchange trading venues, such as alternative trading systems
7. Robert Hatch, Essay, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on
the Security and Exchange Commission's Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools of Liquid-
ity, 78 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1032, 1032 (2010).
8. Scott Patterson, 'Dark Pools' Face Scrutiny: Regulators Ask for Details on Stock Trading in
Murkiest Parts of the Market, WALL ST. J., (June 5, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152.
9. See Adam Sussman et al., US Equity High Frequency Trading: Strategies, Sizing and Market
Structure, TABB GROUP (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.tabbgroup.com/PublicationDe
tail.aspx?PublicationlD=505.
10. LEwis, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing a new fiber-optic cable line between Chicago and
New Jersey able to deliver orders round trip in just 13 milliseconds, which is faster than next
fastest of 14.65 seconds of "The Gold Route").
11. High-Frequency Trading - HFT, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/
high-frequency-trading.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (defining HFT as "[a] program trading
platform that uses powerful computers [and complex algorithms] to transact a large number of
orders at very fast speeds").
12. Front Running, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/frontrunning.asp
(last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
13. Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Princi-
ples for Dark Liquidity, OICU-IOSCO 4 (May 2011), [hereinafter IOSCO Principles for Dark
Liquidity].
14. Id.
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("ATSs"), 15 are the types of sources these market participants must
consult. By necessity, in order to attract and maintain order flow,
trading venues must continually create new and innovative trading
technology. The "expanded use of dark liquidity and the develop-
ment of ... dark pools" are such an innovation. 16 Dark pools are
designed with institutional investors, such as hedge funds or pension
funds, in mind.
In the investment industry, a "pool" serves as a venue for buyers
and sellers of equities, futures, stocks, etc. to come together to trade
their positions; basically, any venue in which trading takes place is
known as a pool. Traditionally, broker-dealers 17 specialized in retriev-
ing information regarding their client's trading needs and subse-
quently matching those needs with another client with opposite
intentions. 8 For example, a broker-dealer with a client looking to buy
Google stock would seek out a seller of Google stock. Negotiations
on stock exchange trading floors or telephone conversations seeking
to identify trading needs required participants to reveal their identi-
ties; trading was much more transparent and human.19 Now, elec-
tronic trading platforms permit users to maintain anonymity in their
search for trading interests.20
"Liquidity" signifies the ease at which a buyer or seller of a security
is able to find a counterpart for their suggested transaction and exe-
cute said transaction without affecting the asset's price; the easier a
buyer of a security can find a seller of a security, or the other way
15. Rule 300(a) of the Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations defines an ATS as
[a]ny organization, association, person, group of persons or system (1) that constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions
commonly performed by a stock exchange within the meaning of Rule 3b-16; and (2)
[t]hat does not (i) set rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than the conduct
of such subscribers' trading on such organization, association, person, group of persons,
or system; or (ii) discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.
SEC Requirements for Security Futures, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2009).
16. IOSCO Principles for Dark Liquidity, supra note 13, at 4.
17. A broker-dealer may be defined as "[a] person or firm in the business of buying and
selling securities, operating as both a broker and a dealer, depending on the transaction." Bro-
ker-dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/termslb/broker-dealer.asp (last visited
Jan. 20, 2013). Typically a broker-dealer describes stock brokerages "because most of them act
as both agents and principals. A brokerage acts as a broker (or agent) when it executes orders
on behalf of clients, whereas it acts as a dealer (or principal) when it trades for its own account."
Id.
18. Stavros Gadinis, Market Structure for Institutional Investors: Comparing the U.S. and E. U.
Regimes, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 311, 320-21 (2008).
19. Id. at 321.
20. Id.
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around, the more liquid a security.21 Liquidity is considered 'dark'
when quotation data, such as price and volume information, of a po-
tential trade is not publicly displayed.22 In other words, dark pools
are private exchanges or trading platforms. Non-disclosure is limited
to the pre-trade state.23 Dark pools report trade executions in the
consolidated trade data;24 however, the trade reports are not required
to identify the particular ATS that executed the trade.25 In short, "un-
disclosed trading interests that increase the market's available trading
opportunities, and therefore its liquidity, are not transparent to any-
one outside the counterparties until the trade is completed. '26 Thus,
such trading interests are called "dark." 27
Although the use of 'dark pool' terminology is new, as perhaps evi-
denced by the SEC's failure to define the term in the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") or in subsequent Commis-
sion rules, dark liquidity is not new.28 Market participants interested
in moving large trades have historically sought to complete their
trades without fully disclosing the extent of their trading interest to
the broader market. 29 Such covertness occurs for good reasons: trad-
ers who notice an increased demand of a certain security may view
that demand as indication of a desirable security and purchase the
security for their personal portfolio, which would ultimately increase
the transaction costs for the large investor. Similarly, opportunistic
traders who notice an increase in demand of a certain security may
attempt to front-run on that demand by purchasing the security ahead
of the large investor and later sell the security to the large investor for
a profit.30 In either scenario, large institutional investors would do
21. BLACK'S LAW DIC-riONARY 460 (4th Pocket Ed. 2011).
22. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,208, 61,209 (Nov. 13, 2009) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) [hereinafter SEC Dark Pools Proposal].
23. Alexandra Zendrian, Don't Be Afraid of the Dark Pools, FORBES (May 18, 2009, 4:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/18/dark-pools-trading-intelligent-investing-exchanges.html.
A 'dark order' "refers to an electronic order that can ... automatically execute[ ] and for which
there is no pre-trade transparency." IOSCO Principles for Dark Liquidity, supra note 13, at 4-5.
24. "Consolidated market data is the primary vehicle for public price transparency in the U.S.
equity markets." SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,208. Included in the market
data are both pre-trade transparency - real-time information on the best-priced quotations for
future executions ("consolidated quotation data"), and post-trade transparency - real-time re-
ports of trades as they are executed ("consolidated trade data"). Id. at 61,208.
25. Id. at 61,209.
26. Gadinis, supra note 18, at 320.
27. Id.
28. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,208.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 61,209.
When information about a large order. . . 'leaks out,' an opportunistic firm can trade in
front of that order to the detriment of the firm that placed it. For example, . . .an
2015]
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well to employ techniques to avoid full disclosure of the extent of
their interest in order to limit increased costs - transaction or
otherwise. 31
Institutional investors traditionally dealt with issues of front-run-
ning by not revealing the full extent of their trade until the last possi-
ble moment.32 Block trading allowed market participants to keep
their trade secret until after it was complete; details of the order
would publish only after the order was placed. Regulation National
Market System ("Regulation NMS") made this strategy exponentially
more difficult to utilize: Regulation NMS requires national exchanges
to collect, merge and publish their venue's posted securities quota-
tions.33 Furthermore, Section 242.611 of Regulation NMS mandates
that broker-dealers acting on behalf of investors only execute trades
at the best available prices. 34 The new regulations decreased the num-
ber of block orders dramatically.35 The SEC recognized the need for
large investors to be able to shed or purchase large orders. Rule 604
of Regulation NMS, which details limit order display requirements,
houses exception 604(b)(4), which provides that a block size order is
exempt from public display requirements unless the customer placing
the order requests the order to be displayed.3 6
institutional investor seeking to buy (or sell) a large amount of stock [may encounter]
an opportunistic firm.., immediately buy[ing] shares at the lowest prevailing offers (or
sell[ing] shares at the highest prevailing bids).... [Tjhe lowest offers (or highest bids)
[will then be] removed from the market, [resulting in] the best offers becom[ing] higher
(or the best bids becoming lower). The market price thus moved up (or down) in re-
sponse to increased demand (or supply). [With a] bid price up (or down), the opportu-
nistic firm can then make money by selling its shares at the new higher price (or buying
shares at the new lower price), knowing that the demand (or supply) from the institu-
tional investor's order will continue to keep the price high (or low).
Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038, *3 (Oct.
24, 2011).
31. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,209. Institutional investors, such as invest-
ment banks or retirement funds, are commonly used as an example of affluent market partici-
pants seeking to trade at large volumes. Id. at 61,208.
32. Id. at 61,208 (discussing how large institutional investors have sought ways to minimize
transaction costs by completing their trades without disclosing the full extent of their trading
interest to the broader market).
33. See Dissemination of Quotations in NMS Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2005); Hatch,
supra note 7, at 1035 (noting that Regulation NMS makes it difficult for investors to keep their
trading interests a secret).
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611. Section 242.611 describes the 'Order Protection Rule'.
35. Hatch, supra note 7, at 1035-36. One estimate placed block trades of 10,000 or more
shares as accounting for over 60% of trade volume of the New York Stock Exchange in April
2001. Id. Five years later, the share dropped to only 18%. Id. at 1036.
36. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,209. "Rule 600(b)(9) of Regulation NMS
defines 'block size' to mean an order of at least 10,000 shares; or for a quantity of stock having a
market value of at least $200,000." Id. at 61,209 n.5.
Despite the Commission's efforts at curtailing dark strategies, Reg-
ulation NMS and the Exchange Act provide certain disclosure loop-
holes: trades could happen in venues where price disclosure was not
mandated. 37 These venues are classified as "Alternative Trading Sys-
tems" ("ATSs"), which are governed by Section 5 of the Exchange
Act and Regulation. 38 Public quotes are not required on unregistered
exchanges, such as dark pools. 39 Though the Commission has sought
to promote public display of trading interest by providing various in-
centives for disclosure, the Commission has never sought to prohibit
the option of dark liquidity services. 4
0
Dark pools are supposed to be the perfect cloaking solution for
those traders who do not wish to tip their hand. 41 Though dark liquid-
ity has long been used as a tool for anonymity and minimal-impact
order execution, dark pools bring a widespread availability of those
benefits to the financial industry.42 Dark pool operators are able to
take bulk orders and divide them up using computer algorithms.
43
The ease of algorithmic software decreased fixed costs for operators,
which resulted in the ability to decrease variable costs, such as per-
share charges, for clients. 44
The benefits of dark pools as murky swamps were recognized with
an increase of trader usage, relative to other exchanges. 45 The share
of trading volume for dark pools has increased; in the second quarter
of 2009, dark pools accounted for over 7% of the United States' trad-
ing volume in listed stocks.46 Over the next five years, the share of
trading volume surged in practice by large institutional investors to
approximately 12 to 15%. 47 By way of comparison, no single regis-
37. Hatch, supra note 7, at 1036 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78mm); see 17 C.F.R. § 242.601(a) (only national securities are required to "file a transaction
reporting plan regarding transactions in listed equity and NASDAQ securities..
38. Hatch, supra note 7, at 1036; see 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
40. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,209.
41. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038, *7
(Oct. 24, 2011); see also Eric R. Sirri, Director, Div. of Trading and Mkts., Keynote Speech at the
SIFMA 2008 Dark Pools Symposium (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl/
2008/spch020108ers.htm.
42. IOSCO Principles for Dark Liquidity, supra note 13, at 4.
43. Hatch, supra note 7, at 1037.
44. See id.
45. Brent Radcliffe, Should You Be Afraid of Dark Pool Liquidity?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/09/dark-pool-liquidity.asp (last visited February 16,
2015).
46. Haoxiang Zhu, Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?, 27 REV. FIN. STUDS. 747, 748
(2014).
47. Marcus Baram, Michael Lewis' "Flash Boys" Exposes Shady World of Dark Pools' Some
Funds Have Already Pulled Out, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2014, 5:35 PM), http://
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tered securities exchange executed more than 23% of the share of
trading volume as of April 2013.48 Dark pools' collective increase in
their share of trading is likely attributed to both regulatory loopholes
and the relatively lower costs of business for traders and clients.49
Despite the advantages described above, dark pools are not without
criticism. Likely a victim of its own success, dark trading has taken
precedence for U.S. regulators after limited oversight in the past.50
B. Government Oversight
Government oversight of dark pool liquidity has been scarce since
the inception of dark pools. 51 Beginning in 2007, the financial indus-
try voiced concerns about dark pools. 52 However, in November 2009,
the SEC released new rule proposals to regulate dark pools, as well as
other alternative stock trading venues that compete with national ex-
changes. 53 FINRA, the private-sector overseer of U.S. brokerages,
proposed rules regarding filing for dark pools in September 2013. 54
Since proposing new regulatory provisions, the SEC has not been
entirely idle on the issue of dark pools. In 2011, the SEC fined the
dark pool firm Pipeline Trading Systems $1 million to resolve claims
that Pipeline failed to disclose to customers that the majority of orders
sent to the firm's dark pool were filled by a wholly-owned trading
www.ibtimes.com/michael-lewis-flash-boys-exposes-shady-world-dark-pools-some-funds-have-
already-pulled-out-1564881.
48. Scott Patterson, 'Dark Pools' Face Scrutiny: Regulators Ask for Details on Stock Trading
in Murkiest Parts of the Market, WALL. ST. J. (June 5, 2013 9:55 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152. The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), which holds the largest market share of any individual registered securities exchange,
accounted for approximately 23% of trading volume. Id.
49. Hatch, supra note 7, 1037.
50. Tim Cave, The Year Dark Trading Surged (and Regulators Hit Back), FIN. NEWS (Dec. 27,
2013), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-12-27/the-year-dark-trading-surged-and-regula-
tors-hit-back?ea9c8a2de0eell1045601ab04d673622; Aubrey Gallo, Developments in Banking
and Financial Law: The Shadow Financial System, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 88, 92 (2009).
51. Gallo, supra note 50, at 92; see also Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, SEC, Strengthening Our
Equity Market Structure (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/
spch090710mls.htm (explaining that nearly all orders are executed by fully automated systems).
"Sophisticated trading firms can process market information, generate buy or sell orders, and
send them to an exchange in less time than it takes to blink your eye. And speed is not all that
has changed." Id. Volume outside the NYSE split among public exchanges, dark pools, and
internalizing broker-dealers. Id.
52. Hatch, supra note 7, at 1039.
53. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,208.
54. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Proposed Rule Change (Form 19b-4), 1 (Sept.
30, 2013), available at http://www.finra.orglweblgroups/industry@ip/@regl@rulfilldocuments/
rulefilings/p354143.pdf [hereinafter FINRA Dark Pools Proposal].
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affiliate. 55 The following year, the SEC fined broker-dealer eBX
$800,000 in order to settle allegations that it allowed third-party oper-
ator of its trading platform, LeveL ATS, to use details on client orders
to its advantage.56 The two administrative proceedings, In re Pipeline
Trading Systems, LLC and In re eBX, LLC, emphasize what this
Comment argues are the two largest dark pool weaknesses demanding
attention by regulatory authorities: information leakage and front-
running.
1. In the Matter of Pipeline Trading Systems, LLC
In 2011, the SEC brought its first ever action against a dark pool
trading platform in the administrative proceeding In the Matter of
Pipeline Trading Systems LLC.57 The action named as Respondents
Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Fred Federspiel and Alfred Berkley.58
Pipeline is a registered broker-dealer and a registered ATS. 59 Feder-
spiel was named party to the proceeding as the founder and Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") of Pipeline. 60 Berkley was similarly
named as the Chairman of Pipeline.
61
The Commission alleged, among other things, that Pipeline Trading
failed to "disclose to its customers that the overwhelming majority of
the shares traded on its ATS were bought or sold by a wholly owned
subsidiary of Pipeline. '62 The Pipeline affiliate ("Affiliate") was cre-
ated to provide liquidity to Pipeline's customers.63 The Commission
found that Pipeline made false and misleading statements regarding
clients' pre-trade information, such as the order's price reasonableness
and minimum size.64 When a customer placed an order, the Block
Board, Pipeline's proprietary graphical interface, would display a
"stock symbol in a small orange-colored box on all the other custom-
ers' computers. '65 The "orange light" failed to note the other's side,
55. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609, 2011 WL 5039038, *1,
*16 (Oct. 24, 2011).
56. eBX, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,969, 2012 WL 4580151, *2, *10 (Oct. 3, 2012).
57. See Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *3.
58. Id. at *3.
59. Thomas Gorman, The SEC's First Action Involving a Dark Pool, LexisNExis LEGAL
NEWSROOM (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/securities/b/
securities/archive/2011/10/26/the-sec-s-first-action-involving-a-dark-pool.aspx.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *2. Affiliate is subject to Regulation
ATS.
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id.
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price, or size. 66 The light would only appear for an order whose price
was reasonable and was sized at least as large as the applicable Large
Block Quantity, or the minimum order size for each stock.67
"Pipeline provided Affiliate a type of electronic connection to the
ATS, one otherwise provided only to customers who were institu-
tional investors. ' 68 When a customer's order triggered the orange
light, Pipeline customers without that special connection could know
only from human observation of their computer's graphical inter-
face. 69 The Affiliate received trade information in a more easily
processed form through a FIX line. 70 Affiliates collection and analysis
of these FIX messages allowed it to create a database that tracked the
precise times during which each stock was orange and white, as well as
certain price information. 71 Ergo, Affiliate had an efficient and accu-
rate means to edge out customers not privy to such information by
"assess[ing] the persistence, side, and approximate limit price of cus-
tomer orders. '72
Pipeline began operations as an alternative trading system.73 It cre-
ated its dark pool in September 2004 in response to ever-increasing
consumer demand for a trading venue that could handle large block
orders without falling to the perils of front-running. 74 The dark pool
was marketed largely to buy-side institutional investors seeking liquid-
ity.75 Affiliate was created to generate enough liquidity to attract cus-
66. Id.
67. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id. at *6 ("FIX is a protocol for transmitting order information in the financial industry.")
71. See id.
72. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *6.
73. Gorman, supra note 59.
74. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *4. According to Pipeline's 2003
internal business plan, "Institutions have always had a problem trading large blocks of shares.
Whenever information about a large institutional order leaks out to the market, several market
intermediaries step in front of such an order. This often results in an adverse movement in the
market price for large trades." Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alfred R. Berkeley
III, Pipeline's chairman, stated that "Pipeline minimizes market impact by keeping ... the de-
tails of the trader's intentions secret" and "is optimized to meet the block trader's need to oper-
ate invisibly in the market.., free from backing away and front running." Id. at *7. Pipeline did
not use the term "front running" to mean the illegal practice of a broker-dealer misusing cus-
tomer trade information to trade stock in its own account, to the detriment of the customer.
Instead, Pipeline targeted institutional investors, who are often wary of "predators" who will
"sniff out" large institutional orders through small orders. Id. at *4. The risk of a small amount
of capital can result in a huge payoff of "information that can be used to trade in piecemeal
fashion in front of the institutional order for the predator's own profit and to the detriment of
the institutional investor. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *5.
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tomers to Pipeline's ATS.76 Pipeline represented itself to be a
"natural" crossing network, meaning that Pipeline did not generate
trades on its ATS platform for the purpose of executing its sub-
scriber's orders. 77 However, Affiliate was in fact created to "[k]eep
the Block Board active" by placing frequent orders and trading with
Pipeline Customers.78 From 2004 to 2009, Affiliate participated in ap-
proximately eighty percent of the trades executed in Pipeline's dark
pool and was largely responsible for increased volume on the ATS.79
Pipeline and Affiliate engaged in numerous tactics to achieve maxi-
mum liquidity. Pipeline provided Affiliate with a "type of electronic
connection" to the dark pool-a type of connection normally exclu-
sive to customers who were institutional investors. 80 This exclusive
connection had the effect of pre-positioning Affiliate in front of Pipe-
line's customer orders. 81 In practice, when a customer order was
placed on the ATS to purchase shares and the order turned the stock
symbol orange on the Block Board, Affiliate would buy shares of the
same stock in other market centers, turn around and attempt to fulfill
the customer's order with the recently acquired shares.82 Conversely,
when a customer order sought to sell shares, Affiliate would short-sell
shares of the same stock in other market centers and buy the cus-
tomer's shares to fulfill the short sale.83 While Affiliate received or-
der information in a more easily processed form over a FIX line,
Pipeline customers without the connection could only know such in-
formation from human observation. 84 Consequently, it became nearly
impossible for a customer to use the information to their trading ad-
vantage. 85 Over time, Pipeline used its data (times during which each
stock was orange and white and price information) to create a
database to efficiently and accurately "assess the persistence, side, and
approximate limit price of customer orders. '86
76. Id. at *4. Pipeline issued a press released on June 5, 2007 with the headline "Block Trad-
ers Flock to Pipeline for Large Natural Liquidity / The Block Market Sustains Record Growth."
Id. at *9.
77. Id. at *6-7. Alfred R. Berkeley III, Pipeline's chairman, stated that Pipeline "acts as a
confidential channel, specifically to bring natural buyers and sellers together ... without dissemi-
nating their intentions." Id. at *7.
78. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *4.
79. Id. at *6, *8.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id.
83. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *5.
84. Id. at *6.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Pipeline and Affiliate employed another tactic aimed at ensuring
their advantage: "flashing. '87 "Flashing," in industry jargon, is the
"practice of placing large numbers of orders only to cancel them im-
mediately afterwards" for the purpose of gleaning the interest of con-
tra-side orders. 88 Affiliate used flashing for, "among other reasons,
... assess[ing] the interest of Pipeline's customers." 89
Pipeline's "inaccurate and misleading marketing and disclosure
materials" 90 complemented its improper use of subscriber's trading in-
formation by "some of the smartest guys in the country." 91 Repeated
disclosures to regulators and subscribers did little or nothing to sup-
port Pipeline's promotion as "a refuge from predators and front-run-
ners. '92 Pipeline promoted itself as "leak-proof" and "predator-
proof" while simultaneously using its own funds and insidious data
collection methods to engage in predatory practices, such as front-run-
ning, that predators in lit markets use.93 Pipeline's use of Affiliate as
an "asset" and a "high-frequency firm that sought to predict the side
and price of Pipeline customers' orders" ultimately gave Affiliate the
ability to do the very things it marketed Pipeline's dark ATS as a safe
harbor from.94
Conflicts of interest emerged; Pipeline's senior management recog-
nized "a direct conflict of interest between Affiliate and a customer['s]
order it was [attempting] to fill. ' ' 95 The Commission found an inverse
relationship between Affiliate and a customer. "In any given trade,
the better the price the customer received, the worse the price the
Affiliate received, and vice-versa. '96 Pipeline's Head Trader imple-
mented an incentive system in an attempt to address the conflicts of
interest. 97 The system utilized a three-prong approach in which trad-
ers would receive compensation based on the sum of three quantities:
(1) the employee's profits and losses from trading; (2) "a quantity
known as the Execution Quality Rebate" ("EQR"); and
87. Id.
88. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *2.
89. Id. at *6.
90. Kiersten Zaza, A Fiduciary Standard as a Tool for Dark Pool Subscribers, 18 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 319, 340 (2013).
91. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *9.
92. Id. at *7.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *9.
95. Id. at *10.
96. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *10.
97. Id.
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(3) $0.007 per share executed by the trader on the ATS. 98 As a result
of the compensation structure, Affiliate's trading became less
profitable 99
Pipeline occasionally disciplined customers by limiting or terminat-
ing their access to Pipeline's dark ATS.1° Pipeline would do this for
various reasons, such as when a customer was found to be "taking
advantage of other customers." 10 1 Pipeline followed no fixed guide-
lines for making disciplinary decisions, but appeared to make such de-
cisions on a facts and circumstances basis.10 2 Ironically, Affiliate was
never disciplined with limited or terminated access to the ATS. 103
The dark ATS Pipeline agreed to pay $1 million in civil penalties to
settle the action with the Commission.1 Additionally, Pipeline agree
to "cease and desist" from violating Section 17(a)(2) and Regulation
ATS in response to the SEC's order. 10 5 The SEC's order found that
Pipeline violated: Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
Rule 301(b)(2) of Regulation ATS under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and Rule 301(b)(10) of Regulation ATS. 10 6 Section 17(a)(2)
prohibits, "in the offer or sale of any securities... obtain[ing] money
... by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing. 107 In other words, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits the use of false or
misleading statements in the sale of securities. 10 8 Rule 301(b)(2) and
98. Id. Prong one was implemented to incentivize traders to generate profits and avoid losses
for Pipeline. Id. Prong two allegedly provided incentives for traders "to provide executions to
Pipeline's customers at prices that were not unfavorable to the customers." Id.
EQR was calculated by subtracting, for each trade on the ATS, (a) the price at which
the Affiliate actually filled a customer's order from (b) the stock's average price on the
market, weighted by volume (known as the volume-weighted average price, or VWAP)
in the 10 minutes immediately before and after when the trade took place on the ATS.
This so-called 20-minute VWAP was intended to serve as a measure of good execution
quality for Pipeline's customers.
Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *11. Prong three was designed to incen-
tivize traders "to execute a high volume of trades opposite customers on the ATS." Id. at *10.
99. Id. at *11. Affiliate lost approximately $19.7 million on its trading for years 2004 to 2006.
Id. Affiliate had almost no net trading losses in 2007. Id. In 2008, 2009, and 2010, Affiliate's
trading profits were $18.4 million, $9.3 million, and $4.5 million, respectively. Id. The Head
Trader was implemented in 2006. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *10.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *12.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, 2011 WL 5039038, at *16.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
108. See id.
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(b)(10) require an ATS operator to disclose certain information in re-
quired filings with the SEC as well as implement safeguards and pro-
cedures for protecting ATS users' confidential trading information. 09
Interestingly, Pipeline's CEO and chairman were charged with per-
sonal liability under the aforementioned rules and regulations for
causing Pipeline to commit its violations.110 Personal liability, then,
could potentially be seen as a punitive tool in future ATS litigation.
2. In the Matter of eBX, LLC
Subsequent to the Pipeline litigation, the SEC filed an action
against eBX, LLC ("eBX") in administrative proceeding In the Matter
of eBX, LLC.111 Named as respondent, eBX is a registered broker
dealer and operator of LeveL ATS, an alternative trading system." 2
LeveL was marketed as a dark pool. 13
The eBX proceeding illustrates how routers, third-party vendors
and dark pool aggregation can result in a breach of information confi-
dentiality.114 The SEC alleged that eBX, through LeveL, violated
Regulation ATS by allowing a "smart order router" to remember sub-
scriber information of unexecuted orders lingering in LeveL."15
LeveL's operation was outsourced to a third-party technology service
provider, Lava Trading. 116 Lava Trading signed a contract "to oper-
ate, host and maintain LeveL." 117 Lava Trading also had an order
routing business, distinct from LeveL, through which it sold order
routing services to its own customers. 1 8 Some of Lava Trading's cus-
tomers were also LeveL subscribers. 119
Lava Trading instructed subscribers to send their orders into LeveL
through the Router, which was used as the FIX gateway.' 20 LeveL
had two principal order types: (1) resting orders and (2) immediate-
or-cancel ("IOC") orders.' 2 ' Resting orders are limit orders to buy at
a price below or sell at a price above the prevailing market price that
109. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.301(b)(2), 242.301(b)(10).
110. Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 65,609,2011 WL 5039038, *16
(Oct. 24, 2011).
111. eBX, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,969, 2012 WL 4580151, *1 (Oct. 3, 2012).
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Zaza, supra note 90, at 331.
115. eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *2.
116. Id. Citigroup owns Lava Trading and is a part owner of eBX and, thus, LeveL.
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *4.
120. eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *3.
121. Id.
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remain in the system for a subscriber-stipulated period of time.122
IOC orders are orders that must be cancelled (in full or in part), by
stipulation of the subscriber, if the order cannot immediately be filled
in full or in part. 123 LeveL subscribers were required to send their
orders, of either type, though Lava Trading to get into LeveL. 124
The Router offered an optional Memory Feature, which "enabled it
to retain a record of any order that [it] had submitted to various mar-
ket centers .. , "125 Information retained by the Memory Feature
included "the symbol, side, source, quantity, and received time" for
the orders.126 The Memory Feature would also retain price and order
attribute information for certain orders. 127 The Memory Feature
could use that information to execute "automated routing
decisions.'1 28
Regulation ATS requires an ATS to "establish adequate safeguards
and procedures to protect subscribers' confidential trading informa-
tion. 1 29 LeveL, from at least 2008 through early 2011, failed to pro-
tect confidential trading information and failed to disclose to all
subscribers the uses allowed to a third party, outside of ATS, to make
of that confidential subscriber information.130 Particularly relevant
was LeveL's allowance of Lava Trading's order routing business ("Or-
der Routing Business" or "Router") to save LeveL subscribers' unex-
ecuted order information, which it used for its own benefit.' 3' LeveL
failed to disclose to subscribers this third-party use. 132 The Order
Routing Business used Level subscribers' information to front-run on
subscribers' orders, similar to Affiliate's use of subscriber information
in Pipeline.133 The Router also stored and kept aware of prices and
122. See Limit order, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/lUlimitorder.asp (last
visited Apr. 7, 2014).
123. See Immediate Or Cancel Order - IOC , INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
terms/i/immediateorcancel.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
124. eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *3.
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10); eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *7.
130. eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *8.
131. Id. at *7.
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id. at *2; see supra Part II.B.1. For example,
if the Router knew that a buy order had been routed to LeveL, the Service Provider
would use that information to route a sell order to LEveL to obtain an execution.
Conversely, if the Service Provider knew that no buy order had been routed to LeveL,
it would likely route any sell order it subsequently received to another destination.
eBX, LLC, 2012 WL 4580151, at *2.
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pricing characteristics of Level's resting orders, which it used to deter-
mine whether to send an order to LeveL, as opposed to a different
venue. 134 Router used the order attribute information in an "attempt
to maximize its [own] customers' executions."' 35 eBX agreed, in a
settlement with the SEC, to pay $800,000 in civil penalties. 136
III. REGULATIONS
On, October 21, 2009, the SEC voted unanimously to propose regu-
latory measures on dark pools. 137 The Commission's proposed rules
are "intended to increase transparency of dark pools so investors get a
clearer view of stock prices and liquidity.' 38 The SEC is not alone in
its endeavor to regulate dark pools. Nearly three years later, on Sep-
tember 30, 2013, FINRA filed a rule proposal with the SEC that
would impose reporting requirements on ATSs, including dark
pools. 139 The rules are designed to provide increased access to pub-
licly available information surrounding trades executed in dark
pools. 140
A. United States Securities & Exchange Commission's
Proposed Regulations
The SEC and financial industry have recently taken notice of dark
pools and the perceived lack of regulation. In 2009, the SEC voted
unanimously to propose regulatory measures aimed at increasing
transparency of dark pools, to the benefit of investors in terms of
prices and liquidity disclosure. 141 The SEC issued three proposals: (1)
treat actionable Indications of Interest ("1OIs") similarly to other
quotes and subject to the same disclosure rules; 142 (2) lower the trad-
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id. at *9.
137. See Issues Proposals to Shed Greater Light on Dark Pools, SEC (Oct. 21, 2009), available
at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223.htm. As of publication, the SEC's proposed
rules have not been approved. This comment is an analysis of those proposed rules and may be
used as an analytical guideline for any future proposals to regulate dark pools.
138. Id.
139. FINRA Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 54, at 1.
140. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,208.
141. FINRA Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 54, at 4.
142. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,233.
Rule 602 of Regulation NMS specifies the public quoting requirements of national se-
curities exchanges, national securities association . . ., exchange members, and OTC
market makers. In general, Rule 602 requires exchange members and certain OTC
market makers to provide their best-priced bids and offers to their respective ex-
changes or FINRA. The exchanges and FINRA, in turn, are required to make their
best bids and offers available in consolidated quotation data.
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ing volume threshold to 0.25% for ATSs, including dark pools that use
actionable IOIs, for displaying best-priced orders; and, (3) create the
same level of post-trade transparency for dark pools as for registered
exchanges by amending existing rules to require real-time disclosure
of the dark pool that executed the trade. 143
In an effort to make trading through dark pools more transparent,
the SEC proposals are intended to "enhance price transparency and
promote fairer and more efficient markets" for U.S.-listed stocks. 144
1. Actionable Indications of Interest
Recent years have seen "a number of dark pools transmit[ting] 1Ois
to selected market participants[,] ... convey[ing] substantial informa-
tion about [the dark pools'] available trading interest."'1 45 Naturally
these messages, similar to displayed quotations, may appreciably in-
duce orders to be routed to a particular venue. 146
OIs do not necessarily provide the receiver all the information,
such as the price and size of available trading interest in the dark pool,
but "the practical context in which they are transmitted ... render[s]
them 'actionable,"' which means the messages "effectively alert the
recipient that the dark pool currently has-trading interest in a particu-
lar symbol, side (buy or sell), size (minimum of a round lot of trading
interest), and price (equal to or better than the national best bid for
buying interest and the national best offer for selling interest)."'1 47
Price information can be explicitly or implicitly obtained through
the 101.148 Generally, Rule 611 of Regulation NMS "prevents trading
centers, including dark pools, from executing orders at prices inferior
to the national best bid or offer ("NBBO")."'1 49 Therefore, an 101
recipient can reasonably assume that "the price associated with the
Id. at 61,211-12.
143. Id. at 61,210.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 61,276.
146. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,226.
147. Id. at 61,226. A 'round lot' can be defined as "a group of 100 shares of a stock, or any
group of shares that can be evenly divided by 100 .... A round lot has historically been the
smallest order that can be placed through an exchange." Round lot, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/r/roundlot.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
148. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,226.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) ("A trading center shall establish, maintain, and enforce writ-
ten policies and procedure that are reasonably designed to prevent trade-throughs on that trad-
ing center of protected quotations in NMS stocks that do not fall within an exception set forth [in
this section] and, if relying on such an exception, that are reasonably designed to assure compli-
ance with the terms of the exception."); SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,226.
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101 is the NBBO or better.' 50 Further, if a "recipient has responded
with orders to the sender" and experienced repeated success by way
of "executions at the NBBO or better with a least one round lot[,
then] the recipient.., can reasonably conclude that a responding con-
tra-side marketable order will result in an execution," so long as the
"dark pool trading interest has not been completely executed against
or cancelled.' 151 The information explicitly and implicitly learned,
then, places actionable OIs on par with displayed quotations at the
NBBO in terms of functionality.1 52
Order information disclosed in actionable OIs can be particularly
valuable in regard to quoted spreads.' 53 If included in the consoli-
dated quotation data, actionable OIs with prices better than the
NBBO, as allowed by Rule 611, would effectively narrow the quoted
spread for an NMS stock.154 With the understanding that the quoted
spread is essentially a negotiation in progress, 155 a reduced quoted
spread indicates that two parties, at the minimum, are closer to an
execution.' 56 Actionable OIs detailing prices (explicitly or implicitly)
equal to the NBBO could also increase the quoted depth at the best
prices for an NMS stock.' 57
"The public [unfortunately] does not have access to this valuable
information concerning the best prices and sizes for NMS stocks.' 58
"[D]ark pools transmit this information only to select market partici-
pants." 59 Therein lies the problem: "actionable OIs [potentially]
create a two-tiered level of access to information [regarding] the best
150. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,226.
151. id. "A 'marketable' order is priced so that it is immediately executable at the best dis-
played quotations (that is, a buy order priced at the national best offer or higher and a sell order
priced at the national best bid or lower)." Id. at 61,211 n.22.
152. Id. at 61,226.
153. Id. The quoted spread is the difference between the bid and ask prices and is calculated
by subtracting each market center's current best bid from that market center's current best ask.
Execution Quality Definitions, BATS TRADING, http://www.batstrading.com/market-data/execu
tion-quality/definitions/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
154. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,211. For example, suppose the NBBO for
an NMS stock were $100.55 and $100.60. An actionable 101 to buy with a price of $100.57 would,
if included in the consolidated quotation data, create a new NBBO of $100.57 and $100.60, re-
sulting in a quoted spread reduced by 40%.
155. Glenn Curtis, The Basics of the Bid-Ask Spread, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investo
pedia.com/articles/trading/121701.asp (last accessed Nov. 8, 2014).
156. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,211.
157. Id. at 61,229. For example, suppose an investor wishes to sell 1000 shares of an NMS
stock when the national best bid may only list 100 shares. Multiple dark pools that contempora-
neously transmit actionable 1OIs to buy the stock (aggregately totaling 900 shares) would re-
present in a 900% increase in the available size at NBBO prices or better.
158. Id. at 61,211.
159. Id.
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prices and sizes for NMS stocks." 160 Such a result undermines the Ex-
change Act's aim of a national market system.161 "The consolidated
quotation data is intended [as] a single source [locale]" for informa-
tion of a listed security's best price across all markets.162 This single
plan processor-that is, the consolidated quotation data-is the alter-
native to forcing the public to obtain data from numerous different
exchanges and markets in order to learn the best prices.163 Dark
pools impede the Exchange Act's objectives by circulating informa-
tion functionally similar to quotations through OIs without including
that information in the consolidated quotation data.164
To address concerns relating to actionable IOIs, the SEC proposes
to amend the Exchange Act quoting requirements to apply expressly
to actionable IOIs.1 6 5 Specifically, it proposes to amend the Rule
600(b)(8) definition of "bid or offer" in Regulation NMS to delete the
exclusion of IOIs.' 66 The way in which "bid or offer" is defined di-
rectly determines the scope of Rule 602 of Regulation NMS and Rule
301(b)(3) of Regulation ATS, which promulgates the types of trading
interests that must be included in the consolidated quotation data.' 67
For example, size-discovery OIs would be excluded from the consoli-
dated quotation data. 68
Rule 602 of Regulation NMS provides the public dissemination re-
quirements for national securities exchanges, national securities as-
sociations, exchange members, and OTC market makers.' 69
160. Id.
161. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,211. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5), providing:
The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing informa-
tion with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system.
Id. (emphasis added).
162. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61226; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b) (providing
that joint cooperation is required of every national securities exchange on which an NMS stock is
traded in order to disseminate all consolidated information through a single plan processor).
163. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61226; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b).
164. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61226.
165. Id. at 61,608.
166. Id. at 61,226.
167. Id. at 61,210 & 61,212.
168. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,210 & 61,225 ("Specifically, the proposed
amendment to the definition would exclude any actionable lOis 'for a quantity of NMS stock
having a market value of at least $200,000 that are communicated only to those who are reasona-
bly believed to represent current contra-side trading interest of at least $200,000' ('size-discovery
1OIs').").
169. Id. at 61,211 (Currently, FINRA is the only national securities association subject to Rule
602.); see 17 C.F.R. § 242.602.
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Currently, Rule 602 requires "exchange members and OTC market
makers to provide their best-priced bids and offers to their respective
exchanges or FINRA.' t70 The exchanges and FINRA "are [then] re-
quired to make their best bids and offers available in the consolidated
quotation data."117t
Regulation NMS currently defines "bid or offer" as
[t]he bid price or the offer price communicated by a member of a
national securities exchange or member of a national securities as-
sociation to any broker or dealer, or to any customer, at which it is
willing to buy or sell one or more round lots of an NMS security, as
either principal or agent, but shall not include indications of
interest.1
72
The original 1978 draft of Rule 602 excluded 1OIs from the definition
of bid or offer.173
Rule 301(b)(3) of Regulation ATS provides the order display and
execution access requirements by which ATSs must comply.1 74 An
ATS that exceeds a 5% trading volume threshold in an NMS stock is
required to provide information of its "best-priced orders to an ex-
change or association for inclusion in the consolidated quotation data
made available under Rule 602. ''175 In Rule 300(e) of Regulation
ATS, "order" is defined to mean "any firm indication of a willingness
to buy or sell a security, as either principal or agent, including any bid
or offer quotation, market order, limit order, or other priced order. '176
To clarify, this definition therefore "includes, but is not limited to, bid
or offer quotations. ' 177 Although Regulation ATS abstains from de-
fining "bid or offer quotation," the SEC considers the term to possess
the same meaning as "bid or offer" within Rule 600(b)(8) of Regula-
tion NMS. 178
170. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,221.
171. Id. at 61,221; See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(8) (emphasis added).
173. Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 14,415,
1978 WL 197002, *9 (Feb. 1, 1978) ("The terms "bid" or "offer" shall mean the bid price of the
offer price most recently communicated by an exchange member or third market maker to any
broker or dealer, or to any customer, at which he is willing to buy or sell a particular amount of a
reported security, as either principal or agent, but shall not include indications of interest.");
SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, 61,212 n.32.
174. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,221; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3).
175. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,212; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3)(B).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(e) (emphasis added); SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at
61,212.
177. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,212.
178. Id. Rule 600(b)(62) of Regulation NMS defines "quotation" to mean "a bid or an offer."
See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(a)(62).
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2. ATS Display Obligations
In conjunction with its proposed amendments regarding lOis, "[t]he
Commission is also proposing certain amendments to Regulation
ATS."' 79  The proposed amendments to Regulation ATS would
"revis[e] the order display requirements in Rule 301(b)(3)," allowing
the national market system incorporation of the best-priced orders on
ATSs. 180 With an amendment to Rule 301(b)(3)(i)(B) specifically, the
Commission seeks to "reduce the average daily trading volume
threshold from 5% to 0.25%. ' 181 The Commission also proposes an
amendment of "Rule 301(b)(3)(ii) of Regulation ATS to clarify that
an ATS must publicly display and provide access to its best-priced or-
ders in NMS stocks when such orders are displayed to more than one
person (other than ATS employees), regardless of whether such per-
sons are subscribers of the ATS. ' ' 182 Finally, the Commission pro-
poses to amend Rule 301(b)(3) to match the "proposed size discovery
exclusion from the definition of 'bid' or 'offer.'"183
Regulation ATS Rule 301(b)(3) "imposes certain order display and
execution access" responsibilities on ATSs. 184 These responsibilities
currently apply to any ATS that meet certain criteria.18 5 ATSs that
meet the criteria must provide "a national securities exchange or na-
tional securities association (each of which is a "self-regulatory organi-
zation" or "SRO")" price and size information for "orders at the
highest buy price and lowest sell price for that NMS stock, displayed
to more than one subscriber of the ATS, for inclusion" by the SRO in
the quotation data made available to vendors. 186 "An ATS that meets
the volume threshold [(currently 5%, but proposed to be lowered to
0.25%)] also [must] comply" with certain access standards, outlined in
Rule 301(b)(3)(iii), regarding what orders an ATS must "provide to
an SRO pursuant to Rule 301(b)(3)(ii)."'1 87 Thus, "the display and
access requirements of Rules 301(b)(3)(ii) and 301(b)(3)(iii), respec-
179. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,213.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,213.
185. Id. Any ATS that meets the following requirements must comply with Rule 301 (b)(3)(ii):
(A) displays subscriber orders to any person (other than alternative trading system
employees); and (B) during at least 4 of the preceding 6 calendar months, had an aver-
age trading volume of 5 percent or more of the aggregate average daily share volume
for [an] NMS stock as reported by an effective transaction reporting plan.
17 CFR § 242.301(b)(3)(i); SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,213.
186. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,213.
187. Id.
2015]
350 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:329
tively," would apply for NMS stocks whose average daily volume with
an ATS were 0.25% or more during at least four of the preceding six
calendar months.'88
Currently, the Regulation ATS display requirements apply only to
orders displayed to more than one subscriber in the alternative trad-
ing system.18 9 By eliminating the phrase "in the alternative trading
system" and replacing it with the phrase "(other than alternative trad-
ing system employees)," the Commission proposes an amendment to
Rule 301(b)(3)(ii) that makes display requirements applicable regard-
less of whether exposed persons are subscribers of the ATS.1 90 By
inserting the exclusionary phrase, the Commission clarifies that no
display obligations are triggered solely because ATS employees can
see order information. 191
Lastly, the Commission proposes to revise Rule 301(b)(3)(ii) of
Regulation ATS by adding an exclusion for certain large orders. 192
The Commission proposes to amend Rule 301(b)(3)(ii) to exclude
"orders having a market value of at least $200,000 that are displayed
only to those who are reasonably believed to represent current contra-
side trading interest of at least $200,000;" a size discovery order,
therefore, does not qualify as an "other priced order" for purposes of
order display and execution access requirements under
Rule 301(b)(3)(ii). 193 The proposed amendment is consistent with
Rule 602.
3. Post-Trade Transparency for ATSs' 94
"Nationwide disclosure of market information is necessary to" en-
sure efficient securities pricing, maximized depth and liquidity of se-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 61,216; see 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3)(B)(ii) ("[sluch alternative trading system shall
provide to a national securities exchange or national securities association the prices and sizes of
orders at the highest buy price and the lowest sell price for such NMS stock, displayed to more
than one person in the alternative trading system, for inclusion in the quotation data made avail-
able by the national securities exchange or national securities association").
190. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,216.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 61,217. Rule 301(b)(3)(ii) currently requires an ATS "to provide to an SRO the
prices and sizes of the orders at the highest buy price and lowest sell price for any NMS stock for
inclusion in the public quote stream that are, [inter alia], displayed to more than one person in
the ATS." Id. at 61,216-17.
193. Id. at 61,217.
194. ATSs are subject to rules set forth in Regulation ATS. SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra
note 22, at 61,219. "ATSs can choose whether to register as national securities exchanges or to
register as broker-dealers . . . ATSs that register as broker-dealers are required to be SRO
members." Id. ATSs must be members of FINRA (an SRO) because they can effect
transactions in the OTC market. Id. Under Rule 601(b) of Regulation NMS, SRO members
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curities markets, and investor opportunity to receive the best possible
executions. 195 The Commission proposes to increase the level of post-
trade transparency for ATSs.196 Specifically, the Commission pro-
poses requiring ATS trades to carry a specific publicly disseminated
identifier in order to equalize the trade reporting requirements with
that of exchanges; the public data stream would disclose the identity
of individual ATSs executing trades. 197 The proposal does not include
required identification of ATSs on trade reports in the public data
stream for large size trades. 198
B. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's Proposed Regulations
On September 30, 2013, FINRA filed with the SEC proposed
changes to FINRA Rules 4552, 6160, 6170, 6480, and 6720.199 The
proposals combine to require ATSs to report to FINRA "weekly vol-
ume information and number of trades" corresponding to securities
transactions within each ATS using a unique market participant iden-
tifier ("MPID"), which are used by registered FINRA firms in lit mar-
kets, when reporting to FINRA. 200 FINRA would then report the
volume and trade count information for equity securities public.201 In
simple terms, the proposed rules look to add transparency to murky
dark pools by requiring ATSs to report certain statistics. FINRA's
proposed regulations are designed to enhance its "regulatory and au-
tomated surveillance efforts," as well as "enhance transparency into
the over-the-counter market. '20 2
1. Reporting Requirement
FINRA's proposed rule changes include creating an obligatory re-
porting responsibility, which would require each ATS to report to
must transmit the information required by the transaction reporting plans to the SRO. Id.
"OTC trades, including trades executed by ATSs, are reported to the consolidated trade streams
through one of the trade reporting facilities ("TRFs") operated by FINRA on behalf of
exchanges, or through FRINA's ADF." Id. The trades are identified as OTC trades in the
published trade reports, but the reports "do not identify the particular ATS or other broker-
dealer that reported the trade." SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, 61,219.
195. Id. at 61,219.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 61,219.
198. Id. at 61,220. "Large size trades" is defined identically as with the other proposed
amendments discussed supra Part III.A.2.: an order of $200,000 or more. Id.
199. FINRA Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 54, at 3. FINRA's proposed regulations are set
to take effect on November 10, 2014.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
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FINRA its "aggregate weekly volume information and number of
trades. '20 3 The information submitted to FINRA would be provided
according to each security in only those securities subject to FINRA
trade reporting requirements. 20 4 Only those ATSs that have filed a
Form ATS with the SEC would be subject to the reporting require-
ment.20 5 The reporting requirement is designed to provide FINRA
with "information necessary to surveil for compliance with the display
obligations and the fair access requirements in Regulations ATS. '' 20 6
The required information would need to be provided "on a security-
by-security basis within seven business days" at the close of each cal-
endar week. 20 7 FINRA would then publish on its website the re-
ported information on a weekly basis, subject to appropriate
disclosures. 208
2. MPID Requirement
In addition to the reporting requirement described above, FINRA's
proposed rule change also "requires that a member operating an ATS
obtain for each ATS a single, unique MPID that is designated for ex-
clusive use for reporting each ATS's transactions. ' 209 Multiple
MPIDs would need to be assigned for members that operate multiple
ATSs. 210
Each member must use each separate MPID to report all executed
transactions within the ATS to the appropriate reporting facility. 211
Once implemented, the proposed rule change would enable FINRA
to easily "determine whether an ATS has reached any of the volume
thresholds in Regulation ATS. '' 212
IV. SUBJECT OF ANALYSIS: ARE PROPOSED DARK POOL
REGULATIONS POISED TO END INFORMATION LEAKAGE
AND FRONT-RUNNING?
This Part analyzes the SEC's and FINRA's proposed regulations of
dark pools in regards to their effectiveness at curbing information
leakage and front-running. Several general principles guide my analy-
203. Id. at 6.
204. FINRA Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 54, at 6.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 8.
209. FINRA Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 54, at 11.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 14.
212. Id. at 15.
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sis. These principles are designed to create a truly dark trading envi-
ronment free of front-running.
First, order price and volume information should generally be trans-
parent to the public. Pre-trade non-transparency may be appropriate
for certain types of market structures and orders, such as large block
orders. Those circumstances require a consideration of the impact
non-transparency will have on price discovery, fairness and overall
market quality end efficiency. Second, post-trade information, includ-
ing trades executed in dark pools or as a result of dark orders entered
in transparent markets, should be transparent to the public. Third, in
place should be a reporting regime and/or means of accessing infor-
mation by appropriate regulatory authorities regarding orders and
trade information in venues that offer trading in dark pools or dark
orders. Fourth, dark pools and transparent markets that offer dark
orders should provide market participants with sufficient information
so that market participants are able to fully understand the manner in
which their orders are handled and executed.
A. Proposal One: Amend "Bid or Offer" to
Include Actionable lOis
The SEC proposes to amend the definition of "bid or offer" to in-
clude actionable 1OIs and, therefore, be subject to disclosure require-
ments.21 3 The SEC's proposal is intuitively sound: dark pools that
transmit 1OIs cannot be considered truly dark because 101 recipients
can reasonably assume that the price associated with the 101 is the
NBBO or better. By transmitting this valuable information to se-
lected market participants only, dark pools create a two-tiered level of
access to information. 214 These mysterious trading pools should be
subject to order price and volume information disclosures or be re-
quired to operate fully dark in order to prevent possible information
leakage.
Practically speaking, by requiring an ATS to include actionable
1OIs in disclosure requirements or, alternatively, to go fully dark, dark
pools will not be able to display 1OIs to only those certain individuals
with a paid connection to a dark pool; dark pools utilizing actionable
1OIs to inform various market participants of availability of liquidity
213. See SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,211-12.
214. See Letter from Ann Vicek, Managing Dir. & Associate Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC 10 (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-27-09/s72709-47.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Ann Vlcek to Elizabeth Murphy].
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within its system would need to display the orders upon which those
IOIs are based as quotes in the public quote stream. 215
B. Proposal Two: Lower the Trading Threshold for Mandated
Public Display
The second SEC proposal is to lower the trading threshold at which
a dark pool must publicly display its price from 5% to 0.25% of the
average daily outstanding stock volume.216 This proposal presents lit-
tle in the way of addressing information leakage and front-running.
This Comment, therefore, refrains from addressing the merits of the
SEC's second proposal.
Of note, though, is this proposal's exclusion of large institutional
block orders from mandated public displaying. The Commission pro-
poses that a quantity of NMS stock with a market value of at least
$200,000 that is communicated to only persons believed to represent
current contra-side trading interest of at least $200,000 would be ex-
cluded from the ATS identity-reporting requirement. 217 Non-trans-
parency in those instances is efficient and in furtherance of overall
market quality; dark pools were designed to be a safe haven for insti-
tutional investors moving block orders.
However, the size discovery exclusion may not be necessary. Spe-
cifically, if the Commission were to permit delayed, as opposed to
real-time, reporting of the identity of ATSs in trade reports as de-
scribed below, a size discovery exemption may be unnecessary. 218
Without delayed identity reporting, though, the SEC's size discovery
exclusion would be necessary to protect block trades from opportunis-
tic traders.219
C. Proposal Three: Require ATSs to Report Real-Time Post-
Trade Data
The SEC's third proposal would require ATSs to be brought into
line with exchanges in terms of reporting real-time post-trade data.
There is a split of opinion among industry commentators on whether
the nature and timing of dark pool data reporting is critical to the
215. Securities and Futures Regulation Group Update: SEC Action on Dark Pools, SCHIFF
HARDIN LLP (Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://www.schiffhardin.com/File%20Library/Publica
tions%20(File%2OBased)/HTML/secfut_112409index.html.
216. See SEC Dark Pools Proposal, supra note 22, at 61,213.
217. See id. at 61,211; see also supra Part III.A.1.
218. Letter from Ann Vlcek to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 206, at 8.
219. Id.
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possibility of information leakage, the susceptibility to front-running
tactics and, ultimately, dark pools' success.
220
Real-time reporting requirements are in direct conflict with the
hallmark objective of "limiting information leakage and market im-
pact on large institutional orders. ' 221 Public identification of a spe-
cific dark pool where a trade has been executed creates concerns that
this information could be used to detect a large institutional buy or
sell order, allowing insidious traders to trade against that order to the
disadvantage of the institution.222 When provided with real-time post-
trade data, particularly the name of the trading dark pool and what
stocks are being traded at what time, insidious arbitrage strategists
would excel at picking off order flow. 223
Of course, post-trade reporting is preferable and such information
should be transparent to the public. The issue here is one of timing:
real-time trade reporting that reveals the name of the specific dark
pool will likely increase the amount of front-running in dark pools.
224
Real-time disclosure, not disclosure generally, would provide preda-
tory short-term traders with information allowing them to take advan-
tage of block order information of institutional investors.225 The
better approach, then, is to amend the SEC's third proposal to require
post-trade reporting, which includes specific dark pool information, to
be "late enough in time so as to be little value" to those insidious
traders looking to front-run.226 Post-market close reporting could of-
fer insight as to market demographics for institutional traders without
offering up trade positions on a platter for insidious traders.227 End-
of-the-week reporting could further reduce the chance of gamesman-
ship, particularly for large block trades executed over multiple days.
2 28
Some industry commentators argue that this requirement is "of lit-
tle consequence to parties executing in [dark pools]. '229 On the issue
220. Letter from Larry Tabb, Founder & CEO, TABB Group, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secre-
tary, SEC 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-09/s72709-21.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Larry Tabb to Elizabeth Murphy].
221. Id.
222. Letter from Seth Merrin, CEO, Liquidnet, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC E-1
(Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-09/s72709-25.pdf [hereinafter
Letter from Seth Merrin to Elizabeth Murphy].
223. Letter from Larry Tabb to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 220, at 4.
224. See id.
225. Letter from Seth Merrin to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 222, at 7.
226. Letter from Larry Tabb to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 220, at 4.
227. Id.
228. Letter from Seth Merrin to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 222, at 7.
229. Early Thoughts on the SEC Proposals to Strengthen Regulation on Dark Pools, WOOD-
BINE Assocs. 3 (Oct. 23 2009), available at http://www.woodbineassociates.com/uploads/Wood
2015]
356 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:329
of information leakage, these commentators contend that "post-exe-
cution market movement due to information leakage is highly un-
likely."2 30 Trading venues have a 90-second reporting window in which
they must report a trade before it is considered late.2 31 A delay, no
matter the size, between execution and reporting makes ex-post price
movement based on real-time post-trade data improbable.232 A re-
porting delay of only two or three seconds after execution is the
equivalent of two-or-three thousand milliseconds. In that amount of
time, a message could be sent from Chicago to New Jersey and back
again 230 times.2 33 In other words, even a short reporting delay of
two or three seconds is considered "an eternity in the current [HFT]
environment," rendering the issue of real-time disclosure moot.2 34
These two positions are not irreconcilable. Knowing that a particu-
lar execution occurred, even two or three seconds after it occurred,
may suggest to a monitoring trader that additional liquidity is still
available in the executing dark pool.2 35 In a likely scenario, a trader
seeking liquidity could use the post-trade information to position itself
on the right side of the market to execute against the residual
shares.236 This is especially apparent in cases where institutional block
orders are executed over multiple days.237 Additionally, if post-mar-
ket close reporting is found to be too generous for opportunistic short-
term traders, the Commission could, instead, require each ATS to
make public the ATS's total aggregate trading volume for the day.2 38
This alternative would provide a perspective of the true marketplace
volume of ATS activity, while maintaining safeguards against informa-
tion leakage. 239
bineOpinion-_EarlyThoughts-_-DarkPoolRegulation_-_October 23_2009.pdf [hereinafter
Woodbine Opinion].
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 9-10, 22 (discussing a new fiber-optic cable line between
Chicago and New Jersey able to deliver orders round trip in just 13 milliseconds, which is faster
than next fastest of 14.65 seconds of "The Gold Route.").
234. Woodbine Opinion, supra note 229, at 3.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Letter from Seth Merrin to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 222, at 7.
238. Letter from Timothy J. Mahoney, CEO, Bids Trading, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secre-
tary, SEC 3 (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http:l/www.sec.govlcommentsls7-27-09/s72709-46.pdf.
239. Id. at 2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC is rightly attempting to regulate dark pools. Given this
Comment's analysis of those proposed regulations in light of the pur-
poses of dark pools, the SEC still needs to do more to protect dark
pool investors.
In re Pipeline Trading Systems, LLC and In re eBX, LLC empha-
size what this Comment argues are the two largest dark pool weak-
nesses demanding attention by regulatory authorities: information
leakage and front-running. This Comment analyzed three SEC pro-
posed regulations, including (1) amending "bid or offer" to include
actionable indications of interest; (2) lowering the trading threshold
for mandated public display; and (3) requiring ATSs to report real-
time post-trade data. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the
proposals are a step in the right direction, but are not adequately de-
signed to target information leakage and front-running. This Com-
ment also provides useful analysis that is applicable to future
proposals and, specifically, for analyzing whether such proposals will
reduce or prevent the two largest dark pool weaknesses.
Dark pool ATSs play an important role in the efficient functioning
of our securities markets. Although the notion of SEC regulation of
dark pools is a positive development, the current proposals need mod-
ification with the prevention of information leakage and predatory
practices in mind.
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